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Abstract
Firms may collaborate in order to mitigate security risks. However, prior economic arguments about the benefits
and costs of sharing security information appear inconsistent. This paper uses social embeddedness to explain
how restricted approaches to information sharing support inter-firm trust, problem-solving and collaboration
while unrestricted sharing approaches can obstruct relationship-building. This social embeddedness perspective
is supported using a case study of a large Asia-Pacific telecommunications provider. The results demonstrate the
benefits of sharing security information with competitors. Empirically, investigations involving both internal and
shared information have lower exposure and loss rates than cases where only internal controls are used. The
study raises implications for both theory and practice.
Keywords: Embeddedness, Sharing, Fraud, Control, Social, Competition, Telecommunications

INTRODUCTION
Security continues to be a problem for the modern firm, with recent estimates of US$25 billion in costs of
security breaches and other threats (Gal-Or and Ghose 2005). Firms may collaborate to mitigate these threats.
However, prior rational economic arguments with respect to information sharing seem inconsistent. For instance,
on one hand some governments have created formal sharing hubs, notably to mitigate terrorist threats, whereby
member firms benefit from periodic vulnerability updates. Examples include Information Sharing and Analysis
Centers (ISACS) (Sveen et al. 2007), Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERT) (Gal-Or and Ghose 2005).
Yet, on the other hand, some argue that firms should keep security measures, processes and intrusions secret,
especially from likely competitors (Gordon and Loeb 2001, Sheng et al. 2005). The risks of disclosure include
adverse market reactions both to the original firm (Hausken 2007) and to other firms in the same industry
(Cavusoglu et al. 2004), and a loss of confidence from both customers and governments (Gal-Or and Ghose
2005). Even if firms did share information, Gordon et al. (2003) argue that market free riders will exhaust any
benefit from sharing.
This paper disentangles this debate by framing prior discourse in terms of social embeddedness. The paper
theorises that when a firm can control the groups with whom it shares security information, it can build trust
between its interorganisational partners and this leads to the net benefits that have been theorised in the literature.
However, when the firm cannot restrict the recipients of its security information, it loses familiarity with trading
partners, no trust develops, and this leads to the theorised (and demonstrated) net costs of information sharing.
To provide empirical support for these benefits, the paper uses a case study of a large telecommunications firms
in the Asia-Pacific region, using access to two years’ worth of both customer fraud data and the relevant case
investigation files. Analysis of this archival data was supplemented by semi-structured interviews with the firm’s
security and fraud manager and investigators over the life of the project. This paper contributes to knowledge by
providing some of the first empirical evidence of the benefits of sharing security information. The paper hence
informs ongoing debate about the relative benefits of sharing or concealing security information (such as Hu et
al. 2007). The paper also informs on the social dimension of security controls, answering calls from Im and
Baskerville (2005) and Dhillon and Backhouse (2001).
This paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the sharing literature to develop a theoretical
foundation for enquiry. This is followed by a discussion of the study’s case research method and approach. The
paper then evidence of each of the three structural antecedents of social embeddedness. This is followed by
implications for both theory and practice.
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SECURITY INFORMATION SHARING AND SOCIAL EMBEDDEDNESS
Firms may collaborate in order to address significant, organised and adaptive threats. Restricted sharing
arrangements allow firms to choose how they share information. Unrestricted sharing requires firms to disclose
security incidents to investors and market regulators. While there may be economic benefits to sharing, security
information is delicate, so trading in it is also dangerous. Because the threat environment can be nimble, security
information can also be unpredictable. In an attempt to unravel this problem, we first conducted a literature
search for all papers that critically examined security information sharing, as shown in Table 1. Papers were
coded by the authors, and two other senior staff verified the coding.
Table 1. Prior Literature in Security Information Sharing, Disclosure and Announcement
Type of Sharing
Restricted sharing
(inter-firm sharing
and notification)

Citation

Context

Method

Schechter and Smith
(2003)

Attack prevention in
Computer Networks

Economic models

Gordon et al. (2003)

Computer security

Economic models

• Free riders don't contribute

Slagell and Yurcik
(2005)

Network intrusion

Framework design

• Privacy concerns
• vulnerability signalling

Slagell et al. (2005)

Network intrusion

Software design

• May also inform attackers

Hausken (2007)

Cyber attacks

Game theory

• Attackers are better informed
• free riders

Boeyen (2007)

Financial fraud

Framework design

Burstein (2007)

Network intrusion

Theoretical

Cavusoglu et al. (2008)

IT Security investment

Game theory

Hsin et al. (2005)

Collaborative Network
Defense

Software design

• Privacy concerns

Zhao et al. (2008)

Internet security

Game theory

• communications overhead

Gal-Or and Ghose
(2005)

Information security
breaches

Game theory

Software vulnerability

Game theory

Unrestricted
sharing (disclosures Cavusoglu et al. (2007)
and
announcements)
Li and Rao (2007)

Software vulnerability

Freeman (2007)

Software vulnerability

Arora et al. (2006)

Software vulnerability

Arora and Telang (2005) Software vulnerability
Arora et al. (2008)

Software vulnerability

Johnson (2008)

P2P File Sharing

Ghose and Rajan (2006)

Information security
investment

Campbell et al. (2003)
Telang and Wattal
(2007)

Information security
breaches
Software vulnerability and
Market Reaction

Costs

• cost of data preparation

• Possibility of social loss
• heightened vulnerability
• heightened information for
offenders
Empirical archival
• Increased vulnerability
(1,570 incidents)
• heightened attacks
• Adverse publicity
• heightened risk of attack
Case study
• does not improve security
• legal threats to disclosers
Empirical archival
• Increased vulnerability
(2,952 incidents)
• heightened attacks
Economic model and • Vulnerability signalling
case study
• increased attacks
• Signals system vulnerability to
Economic models
attacker
• Users may not understand threat
• Availability of confidential
Empirical archival (30 information
banks)
• risk of identity fraud
• third party data loss
• Compliance costs
Economic models
• increased workload
• reduction in social welfare
Event study (43
• Loss of market value
incidents)
• heightened threat level
Event study (147
• Loss of market value
incidents)
• heightened threat level

Benefits
• sharers improve security reputation
• increases knowledge of sharers
• reduced attack incidence
• reduced spending for each firm
• increase in total welfare
• knowledge of attack vectors
• improved inter-firm coordination
• vulnerability identification
• knowledge of attack vectors
• better training and learning
• vulnerability identification
• trading partners are better informed
• improved prediction and mitigation
• better forensic investigations
• support for offender prosecution
• eases detection difficulty
• heightened profile
• Insight into hacker behaviour
• improved detection understanding
• promotes security standards
• useful for discovering coordinated
attacks
• improved communication
environment
• improved ISP efficiency
• improved reputation signals
• increased product demand
• strategic effects on price
• improved bug fixing
• cost sharing between firms
• heightened user protection
• prevent widespread vulnerability
• improved product quality
• improved product quality
• increased awareness
• increases vulnerability awareness
• improves software quality

• greater accountability
• control vulnerability identification
• may presage security investment
• improved product quality

The table makes clear the competing views regarding the relative merits and drawbacks of externalising security
information. Studies in Table 1 are sorted according to the type of sharing studied. By grouping prior work
according to their implied interpretation of sharing, it can be seen that prior debate about the costs and benefits of
sharing may have been due to varied interpretations of externalising security information itself. On one hand,
restricted approaches to externalising security information, such as external and internal sharing, seem to suggest
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a majority of benefits. On the other hand, studies of unrestricted approaches, such as disclosure and market
announcements, seem to suggest a balance of costs. In other words, prior studies have held that restricted sharing
should yield benefits, while unrestricted forms of sharing, such as disclosure, are costly.
We propose that purely economic perspectives do not fully explain these circumstances. For example,
transaction cost approaches emphasize bargaining behaviour between buyers and sellers, such that self-interest
compels opportunistic trading (Ghoshal and Moran 1996). Yet, in the short term, buyers and sellers cannot be
sure of the value or relevance of security information before they have seen it. Game theoretic approaches have
seen frequent application to these information sharing arrangements. However, the theoretical position that game
players will defect against other information suppliers is inconsistent with the theoretical benefits to restricted
sharing seen in Table 1. If actors do defect because of costs in the current period, they are unable to build the
inter-organisational relationships that could give them insight into future costs and benefits. Without maintaining
close relationships with other firms, organisations also can not know the value of their own security information
in isolation.
In contrast, social embeddedness offers a possible explanation for why restricted sharing yields greater benefit
than unrestricted sharing. Under this perspective, inter-organisational behaviour is underpinned by social
interaction and relationships (Uzzi 1997). Instead of calculating returns to transactions based on punctuated self
interest and short term economic rents, firms prefer long term cooperation based on interpersonal ties (Dore
1983, Romo and Schwartz 1995). This relationship building provides a number of benefits to the firm. Over
time, firms engage in repeated problem solving activities, build trust, and encourage greater collaboration
(Chatfield and Yetton 2000). These “value constellations” (Lee 2001) deliver benefits to trading, the supply
chain and operational efficiency (Schopler 1987, Van de Ven 2005, D’Aubeterre et al. 2008). Alternatively,
when firms are unable to interact and develop ties, embeddedness will be low. Stable collaboration eludes
participants because they do not develop social relations outside conventional economic trades (Granovetter
1985, Rai et al. 2009).
Social embeddedness comprises three main components, each with a set of structural antecedents (Uzzi 1996).
First, the capacity to reciprocate actions and support for voluntary relationship contributions leads to trust.
Second, face to face interaction and greater use of tacit understanding lead to fine-grained information. Third,
collaboration and persistence, as opposed to market exiting behaviour, lead to joint problem solving. Amid these
three components, trust acts as the primary overarching structure (Uzzi 1997).
Applying social embeddedness to sharing security information, we posit that restricted sharing should yield
benefits because the market participants are able to build trust, transact in fine-grained information, and solve
problems together by virtue of closer social relationships. This perspective appears consistent with early
empirical evidence from Loch et al. (1992) indicating that respondents perceived little threat from competitors
and external networks. However, unrestricted forms of sharing, such as disclosure, are costly because the firm
loses control over who receives their security information, and the shared experiences that ordinarily promote
collaboration and trust do not form. However, while there is empirical support for the costs of unrestricted
sharing, there has been no prior empirical validation of the benefits of restricted sharing. With social
embeddedness as a foundation, we use a case study to address this gap.

RESEARCH METHOD
Research into fraud is particularly difficult, due to problems of researcher access and trust, problems of
identifying subjects and incidents, and the veracity of data itself (Kotulic and Clark 2004). Sensitive to these
concerns, our overall research approach was one of careful relationship-building with the participating firm. The
case study firm is a foreign owned Australian telecommunications carrier, employing more than 3,000 people.
The firm offers a range of hardware products and telecommunications services, sold both by the firm, and
through a network of agent dealers spread across the region. These include conventional voice services, such as
reverse-charges and international trunk dialling, landline, long-distance and mobile voice communications, as
well as data services such as broadband and dialup internet access.
Methodologically, we aimed for both quantitative and qualitative analysis approaches, after Benbasat et al.
(1987). In order to best make sense of the phenomena under investigation, we used a number of data sources to
build an understanding of the case (Salkind 2003). Unique among these is that the case firm has, where possible,
granted us access to their full customer fraud data over a two year period, including case notes made by the
investigators themselves. This data provided rich insight into the firm’s investigation processes and controls.
The first stage of the analysis involved data inspection. Textual post-coding was used to investigate and classify
the case notes, using coding processes described by Ryan and Bernard (2000). Where confusion or disagreement
arose, the opinions of two other researchers were sought. This stage revealed the complex nature of the various
fraud types and investigative processes at hand. To make sense of these relationships and principle findings, we
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conducted a series of semi-structured interviews with fraud managers during and after the collection of the fraud
data, using Yin (2003). These interviews, in concert with documentation, were used to inform and gain insight
into the processes in use in the firm (Seidman 1991).
As is the case with many modern firms, this firm takes a structured approach to new customer procedures, using
a range of standard general and application controls to verify identity and intention at the account creation stage.
These controls include written policies, physical and electronic access devices, user logging, semantic and
syntactic data checks, application credit histories and objective identification checks. Importantly, the data
analysed in this paper constitutes cases of actual fraud, and not simple bill delinquency. These fraud cases have
hence been able to overcome or bypass these static general controls.

TRUST
The first component of embeddedness, trust, relates to the belief that exchange partners do not act in self-interest
at another partner’s expense (Uzzi 1997). Our analysis first illustrates the importance placed on interpersonal and
inter-organisational relationships in the security function. First, with regard to extracting value from control
networks, the interviewees couched their operations in terms of providing high profile, identifiable business
value to the firm and, interestingly, to external groups. The ability to deliver clear benefit was critical in order to
effectively convince senior management to fund ongoing and expanded activities. One senior investigator noted,
“Time is a critical factor in our work, in terms of time to detect and time to confirm the suspicion
of fraud, and subsequent action to suspend the account”
In this context, maintaining an unworkable institutional control was not viable and could contribute adversely to
the fraud unit’s reputation and value effectiveness. In their own judgment of what controls most effectively
responded to the criminality confronting the organisation, the interviewees were unified in their belief in the
value of a networked and combined approach. When prompted on this aspect, the manager stated,
“As our performance measures indicate, we are much more superior in both preventing and
detecting fraud against the company where we have access to information from within and
outside the company”.
This finding is a key departure from prior literature, in that within the case study firm, and among some other
firms the telecommunications industry, fraud control is not solely an internalised process. A networked approach
to mixed control deployment was integral to disrupting criminal behaviour, with a senior investigator stating,
“Criminals could be stopped overnight if both government and private victim organisations
talked about what they are seeing. The crooks rely on the blindness of victim organisations as a
winning strategy in their endeavours”
The interviewees were also prompted to comment on the balance between competition and collaboration. The
case study organisation depends on competitors, banks, credit reference authorities and other external sources of
information for both prevention and detection control purposes. In particular, competitors could provide a rich
source of information on potential and actual fraud cases. Expanding on this finding, the manager stated,
“The scary thing is that to do this [fraud response] job effectively, we actually rely upon the
good work of our competitors in the industry. Likewise, these same competitors rely on us”
As an example of the important role played by competitors, the senior investigator provided the example of call
selling operations, stating,
“With call selling, where an organised crime group obtains ten, twenty, or more mobiles and
some landlines, then on-sells these to their criminal network or let’s say their community of
interest to disrupt law enforcement, they tend to operate a pretty complex network of phones
involving many carriers. These operations hit the industry hard, often with great speed and little
warning. We have controls in place that detect part of the picture, for example high tolling or hot
destination flags, but to get enough of the picture, we need other industry members”.
While competitors could benefit from sharing fraud and security information, non-sharers could be effectively
penalised. The manager revealed that, “it becomes known throughout the industry quite quickly who’s playing
ball and who’s not. It can work the other way, you know”. This comment highlights the potential costs of not
sharing fraud information between firms, and it suggests that non-sharing firms may become victims of fraud
before they have a chance to develop appropriate controls and counter-measures.
The interviewees saw rich, informal systems partly as a panacea for, and a reaction to, the significant time taken
for the firm to develop appropriate formalised security controls. While formalized controls could be effective,
the criminal element could quickly develop new methods to overcome them. As a partial response to this
sluggishness, security champions inside the firm had created informal interpersonal networks, sometimes based
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on personal contacts at other institutions. The manager noted, “I just run the show, my staff do all the work”. In
this context, the interviews also informed the possibility that different investigative approaches among industry
members was a strength, and not a weakness. Varying institutional controls coupled with ‘home-grown’ security
controls could make systematic fraud harder. For example, the manager noted,
“Although to some extent we rely upon each other for information on suspected fraud, we don’t
know too much about how each telco actually structures and undertakes their fraud function.
That part of what we do I guess is still entrenched within the ‘competitiveness’ of industry”
This suggested that widespread adoption of ‘industry best practice’ could, in some cases, actually work against
identifying fraudulent activity because each firm conducts their analyses in the same way, with the same data.

FINE-GRAINED INFORMATION
The second component of embeddedness, fine grained information, relates to the use and exchange of tacit and
proprietary information with related firms. This second stage of the analysis illustrates the extraction and
employment of fine-grained information to mitigate fraud threats, exploring the relation between the fraud types
faced by the firm, and the controls used to detect this fraud. Figure 1 gives an overview of the types of fraud seen
in the case firm. Howard’s (1997) taxonomy is used, describing the tools (the point of origin), access (the
facilitating or enabling functions involved) and results of fraud (the ensuing fraud types and their degree of
technical sophistication).
Tools

Accesses

Results
Hardware Theft
SMS Fraud

No Direct
Interface

Subscription

Identity Theft

Dealer

Identity Fraud
Perpetrator’s
Real Identity

Premium Rate Fraud
Roaming Fraud
Mobile Cloning
Internal
Call Selling
Infrastructure

War Driving
SIM-Boxing
Wire Tapping

Figure 1: Fraud Tools, Access and Results
First, the tools or initiating points of fraud in the case data comprised identity fraud, identity theft, no direct
interface, and the perpetrator’s actual identity. Consistent with Brenner (2004), identity theft was defined as the
theft of a real person’s identity, living or dead, such as their name, date of birth, or a combination of both that
would lead to the association of the fraud with an innocent third party. Identity fraud was defined as the use of a
fictitious identity that could not be attributed to an innocent third party (whether this third party existed or not).
The case data also featured instances where no direct interface occurred, whereby the system was compromised
without the perpetrator having direct contact with the firm. Examples of this included stolen handsets and mobile
broadband dongles, possibly in order to obtain credit card details from merchants and banks as a pre-cursor to
credit card fraud. Finally, in some cases, the perpetrator did not conceal their identity when committing the
fraud.
Accesses were the points of direct engagement that enabled or facilitated the fraud with respect to the firm. The
first was Subscription, where the perpetrator committed the fraud by direct application to the firm. Channels can
include website applications, mail, retail outlets and dealers (where the dealer is not suspected of intentionally
facilitating the fraudulent application). The second was the Dealer, where resellers and agents intentionally
facilitate or originate fraudulently acquired products and services. The third access was Internal fraud, where an
employee of the case study firm facilitated or originated the fraud. The fourth access was Infrastructure, whereby
a perpetrator had obtained direct physical access to communications or data services without having to interact
with the carrier’s application or customer account environment.
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Results ranged from relatively straightforward thefts of phone handsets to sophisticated crimes such as call
selling. Here, a perpetrator with a fraudulent identity applies for a mobile phone, who then uses this phone to sell
international communications services to others without charge (particularly to ‘hot destination’ countries that
are likely to be monitored by law enforcement). Although the precursor fraud may be subscriber or dealer fraud
through the use of identity fraud, the on-use of these services relies techniques to conceal normal call patterns.
For example, in some of the high-toll frauds detected by the firm, the call selling group would route their
international calls via pre-defined satellites that disguise normal caller patterns. Perpetrators may also exploit
billing cycles, reducing the effectiveness of account payment controls. In addition to these frauds against the
carrier’s systems, each of these frauds could also be part of a larger fraud on a different organisation. For
example, a customer may aim to establish a credible history with the carrier so as to build another identity
(perhaps with which to acquire a credit card at another firm). In this regard, the firm can be at once a victim, an
accessory and an instrument to fraud.
The next stage of the analysis explored the organisational response use of information and understanding to the
fraud environment. The first coding pass revealed 35 primary controls. This list was subsequently distilled down
to 17 controls. Table 2 shows the full list of controls and their observed attributes.
Table 2. Fraud Controls Used in the Case Firm
Preventive (P)
Detective (D)
Both (B)

Institutional (I)

Automatic (A)

Informal (N)

Discretionary (D)

Initial (I)
Subsequent (S)
Both (B)

Internal Controls

1. Dealer Audit
2. Associated Accounts
3. Fraud Database Check
4. Hot Destination Flag
5. High Tolling Flag
6. Bill Return to Sender
7. Point of Application Referral
8. Billing Department Referral
9. Customer Uncontactable
10. Customer Contacted – Suspicious
Behaviour

B
B
B
D
D
D
P
D
B
B

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
N
N

D
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
D
D

B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B

External Controls

11. Credit Report
12. Customer Detection of Identity Theft
13. Carrier Alert
14. Banking Alert
15. Law Enforcement Enquiry
16. Employer Check
17. Other (e.g. “Tip Off”)

B
D
B
B
B
B
B

I
N
N
N
N
N
N

A
D
D
D
D
D
D

B
B
B
B
B
B
B

The textual coding process proved very useful in the initial analysis. It allowed the researchers to review not only
the function of the controls, but also the information contexts in which the controls were used. First, controls
were either internal to the firm, or external to its operations. A significant number of fraud cases were identified
or solved using notice and information from external groups, such as banks, law enforcement or, interestingly,
other telecommunications firms. Second, for each case, there was a single originating system control that began
the investigation process. For some types of fraud, one or more subsequent controls were then used in the
evidence-gathering process. For complicated fraud, such as identity theft, these subsequent controls were
instrumental in building the chain of evidence eventually leading to remedy. Third, in addition to the formal
control methods used to detect and investigate fraud, a number of informal controls were used. For example, in
one case an investigator had built a relationship with another staff member, who periodically notified that
investigator of suspicious accounts, customers or dealers. Close working relationships between investigators
allowed them to share ‘hunches’ that formal technical controls could not otherwise pick up (such as identifying
particular customer accents, mis-spellings of surnames or familiar residential addresses). Fourth, not all controls
were invoked for each case. Many cases apprehended with zero loss and exposure were identified using
automatic screening controls shortly after the account creation stage. However, other controls were invoked on a
more discretionary basis. An example of this is the dealer audit control, which could be instigated if a particular
dealer had triggered another control (such as a high spending alert or a billing alert).
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JOINT PROBLEM SOLVING
The third component of embeddedness, joint problem solving, describes the firm’s ability to coordinate problemsolving activities with other external actors. We first illustrate how the controls discussed in the previous section
are used together to effect a fraud control outcome. We then present empirical evidence of how external
information sharing is beneficial to the firm. The controls presented in the previous section were frequently used
in concert to produce an effective system defence. Figure 2 shows examples of the combinations of controls that
can be used in the investigation process.
Fraud Type

Originating Control

Identity Fraud

High Toll Report
(internal, institutional,
automatic)

Identity Theft

Hot Destination
(internal, institutional,
automatic)

Billing Dept Referral
(internal, institutional,
automatic)

Billing Dept Referral
(internal, institutional,
automatic)

Billing Dept Referral
(internal, institutional,
automatic)

Investigator suspicious
(internal, informal,
discretionary)

Telco Alert

Investigator suspicious
(internal, informal,
discretionary)

Telco Alert

Perpetrator
Using Own
Identity

Call Selling

(external, discretionary)

Subsequent Investigative Controls

Customer detection
(external, discretionary)

Employer Check
(internal, informal,
discretionary)

(external, discretionary)

Figure 2. Fraud Types and Chains of Confirmation
Analysis was then conducted to determine whether there was any financial advantage of collaborating with
external groups in the investigation process. Of the 3247 cases, 2880 cases exhibited positive financial losses. A
Two Way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was conducted on the cases involving these positive losses. Positive
Exposure was used as a covariate. Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for the controls and fraud types
featured in the data set. Table 4 shows the results of the ANOVA tests. The testing revealed several interesting
phenomena with regard to Control Type, which exhibited a main significant effect with an F statistic of 14.742.
Regardless of Fraud Type, mean losses were lowest when both internal and external controls were used.
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for Controls and Fraud Type Against Total Losses
Control Type

Fraud Type

Mean

Std. Deviation

N

Internal

Dealer Fraud

890.47

271.260

387

Identity Fraud

849.11

2039.617

1039

Identity Theft

706.56

689.741

7

Total

859.58

1742.907

1433

Identity Fraud

1665.24

3221.905

292

Identity Theft

2328.10

2797.725

20

Total

1707.73

3196.520

312

Dealer Fraud

.12

.567

23

Identity Fraud

549.03

2758.233

1017

Identity Theft

464.07

689.573

95

Total

530.79

2619.542

1135

Dealer Fraud

840.53

333.950

410

Identity Fraud

820.63

2557.613

2348

Identity Theft

783.56

1448.056

122

Total

821.89

2331.676

2880

External

Internal and External

Total

Dependent Variable: Total Losses

Table 4. Two-Way ANOVA Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Source

Type III Sum of Squares

df

Mean Square

F

Sig.

Exposure

31946253.364

1

31946253.364

6.010

.014
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Control Type

156727285.673

2

78363642.837

14.742

.000

Fraud Type

685040.592

2

342520.296

.064

.938

Control Type * Fraud Type

19065459.957

3

6355153.319

1.196

.310

Error

15261194786.671

2871

5315637.334

a R Squared = .025 (Adjusted R Squared = .022). Dependent Variable: Total Losses

With regard to Fraud Type, Identity Fraud is by far the most common with 2348 cases exhibiting positive losses.
The least common Fraud Type was Identity Theft, but also one of the most complex to execute. The mean values
show that seven cases of Identity theft were detected by internal controls alone, but 20 were detected solely by
external parties, before the firm’s own internal systems. The most effective control method for identifying
Identity Theft was the use of both internal and external controls in the investigation process. This evidence
suggests that firms in the sharing network are better off than the otherwise similar firms who operate alone.
The value of external sharing networks is also evident in detecting Identity Theft cases solely by external
controls. Mean losses were highest for Identity Theft discovered by external controls (2328.1). That the firm’s
internal controls had not identified these cases suggests that perhaps the offenders had developed systematic
ways of evading apprehension via intimate knowledge of the case firm and its internal systems. External controls
may have been able to identify these offenders because these external controls were functionally different to
those of the case firm. Predictably, external controls were not frequently used to identify Dealer Fraud: as most
dealers are contractually bound to a single telecommunications network provider, it is unlikely that an external
entity would be able to reliably observe the internal mechanics of a dealer. Such problems would be best
detected by internal dealer audits (of the 410 cases of dealer fraud, 309 were identified by dealer audits).

CONCLUSIONS
Prior literature has conceptualised alternative information sharing postures. This study has contributed to this
discourse through advancing theory on the nature and behaviour of operational security controls in a highly
competitive and rapidly evolving industry. Using a social embeddedness foundation, this research presented an
inter-organisational perspective where practice actually relies on the removal of competitive barriers for
successful information system control and security performance. Whereas some prior work has argued that
human actors are the least secure point in a system (Perry 1985, Vroom and von Solms 2004, Im and Baskerville
2005), this study indirectly finds that human actors can also be of tremendous advantage in the detection process,
particularly when given the benefit of effective information sharing networks. Human actors can provide tacit
insight into a fraudulent case, using intuition, memory and ‘gut feeling’ to determine a case’s veracity.
The study may be open to a number of limitations. First, some of the testing in this study was based on observed
or detected criminal activity. Such detection may not be perfect and the cases brought to light may exhibit
unseen bias. Second, the actual frequency of fraud types may vary from those seen in this paper, as well executed
fraud may evade detection. These limitations are likely to affect many empirical fraud studies of this nature.
This study is some of the first work to empirically reveal the benefits of using external and internal controls in
the system control ecology. A number of avenues for future work arise. The analysis demonstrated that
performance outcomes were enhanced where combinations of controls were employed. Further work on the
effect of criminal complexity on control combinations, reliance and performance is required. In particular, future
work could examine the extent to which control selection is influenced by collaborative performance level
targets and competitive practice. This study also saw evidence of a move away from purely technical solutions to
security problems. Echoing the advice of Siponen (2005), more research work into socio-technical and social
approaches for identifying risky behaviour would be valuable.
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